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There is a tendency for some economists who are less familiar with game theory to 
comment that it has never fulfilled its early promise, that it essentially has little to 
offer as a tool to understand, predict and guide human social and economic behaviour. 
For instance in Sylvia Nasar’s book ‘A Beautiful Mind’ she recounts the remarkable 
controversy that surrounded the award of a Nobel prize for game theory, including 
one committee member apparently asking for ‘a single major example that game 
theory had any empirical validity whatsoever’ (p.371).  An excellent reply to such 
sceptics would be to present them with a copy of Colin Camerer’s new book, 
‘Behavioral Game Theory’. This is not to say that his book catalogues an unbroken 
string of successes for the theory; as we shall see neither game theory nor human 
behaviour emerges unscathed from the body of work reported therein. 
 
Camerer’s book is an up-to-date and comprehensive look at a relatively new but fast-
growing area of economics concerned with using experimental methods to investigate 
strategic interaction. Grouped into nine chapters he summarises several hundreds of 
studies on different aspects of game theory, from mixed-strategy equilibrium to 
dominance-solvable games to signalling games, carefully synthesising what has been 
learned and frequently drawing attention to what has still to be discovered. One virtue 
of this book is simply that it has brought into one volume the remarkable breadth and 
depth of research that has gone on in this area. Even those who, like myself, thought 
we were keeping at least one eye on this literature may discover entire bodies of work 
that we were unaware of.  
                                                 
* I would like to thank Martin Dufwenberg and participants in his behavioral game theory seminar in 
2004 at the University of Arizona for inspiring me to read and discuss Colin Camerer’s book. A 
number of the points I raise were prompted by listening to and reflecting upon the comments of Martin 
and his students. However I remain solely responsible for any errors or misinterpretations that may be 
contained herein. I also wish to thank the Economics Department at Arizona where I began this review.   2 
There are naturally limits to its scope; in the preface he mentions some omissions 
such as cooperative games, and deliberately skimpy treatment e.g., public goods 
games and auctions. However he also tends to avoid related experiments published in 
the psychology and biology journals. This is a reasonable decision given that 
boundaries must be drawn somewhere, however, I will later question whether one or 
two of the claims he makes are as a consequence less justified than they might be. 
 
Before we look at some of the many interesting experiments and findings reported in 
the chapters of this book, I will begin with a discussion of some general themes and 
issues that I think deserve extra attention. I follow that section with a selection of 
studies that interested me, as well as his occasional errors, in the order of the chapters 
in the text, along with some other observations. Due to the large number of different 
games discussed, I will mostly assume the reader has basic familiarity with at least the 
more well-known ones. 
 
Broad Issues 
The first and perhaps most fundamental issue we need to confront is how should we 
interpret and use the experimental data generated by the behavioural game theory 
project? For example, can we conclude that a game theoretic concept is refuted if data 
drawn from an experiment designed specifically to showcase its predictive power 
finds no such evidence? Or does it refute the rationality assumption for the human 
behaviour that generated the data? In Chapter 1 Camerer goes to some trouble to 
explain why the uncovering of empirical regularities in human strategic interaction is 
needed to inform the future development of game theory. What should we make of 
this use of the data and the interpretations on which it rests? 
 
Many economists see game theory as simply a set of answers to mathematical 
questions and such answers can be neither disproved nor improved upon by observing 
the behaviour of student subjects in some experiment. But this view surely misses the 
point. Although it is true no abstract mathematical object can be refuted by any 
experiment, economics is not interested in any particular mathematical object for its 
own sake; they are a part of our subject matter only if they can assist us in our 
projects. So the ‘necessary truths’ defence of game theory doesn’t explain why we in 
economics should make any more use of those truths than of other mathematical   3 
truths that have not been co-opted into economics. In light of this we might instead 
ask: can experimental data lead us to conclude that some game theoretic concept does 
not have the relevance, or context-independent predictive power, for the study of 
human strategic interactions that economists had previously ascribed to it? Can such 
data guide us in seeking out more ‘useful’ mathematical concepts, rather as biologists 
look to nature when modelling biological facts?  
 
One line of defence for the continued use of empirically dubious game theoretic 
concepts is that we may believe game theory describes a benchmark of optimal play, 
even if human behaviour often falls short of the ideal. In these cases we may be able 
to use the concepts in a normative and prescriptive sense, to improve our 
performance. An example of this might be a constant-sum game such as tennis, in 
which an informed coach could use insights drawn from mixed-strategy equilibrium 
to raise the win-rate of the player who employs him. Even in these cases it is 
important to remember that if others are not playing optimally we can often do better 
than our notional equilibrium strategy by exploiting their sub-optimality. This point is 
vividly illustrated in the Beauty Contest game, as described in Chapter 5. 
 
Alternatively, we may not accept that the empirically flawed concepts have normative 
validity, choosing instead to stand by our actions. The convention in nearly all of 
traditional economics is to assume that people are both rational and self-interested. 
Applied to game theory this means assuming players have unlimited reasoning powers 
and utilities that are a simple function of their own dollar payoffs. Using these 
assumptions for human decision-making, experimentalists apply the concepts of game 
theory to predict the outcomes of human strategic interactions. But if the perfect 
rationality and self interest assumptions are inappropriate, perhaps we can justify our 
violation of the game theoretic predictions. 
 
For instance, in the ultimatum game the prediction of game theory coupled with these 
two behavioural assumptions alone is that responders will accept any positive share of 
the pie from the proposer, rather than reject the offer and have both parties receive 
nothing. Or in the beauty contest game (to be explained later) the prediction of game 
theory is that players will reason their way to the unique sub-game perfect 
equilibrium, even though many levels of reasoning are required of players to support   4 
this prediction. As Camerer explains in Chapters 1, 2 and elsewhere, these predictions 
have repeatedly failed in experiments. This is surprising in the sense that these 
assumptions regarding human behaviour have been very successful in most other 
areas of economics, going all the way back to Adam Smith’s remarks on the 
irrelevance of the benevolence of the butcher and the baker for the workings of the 
invisible hand.  
 
Should we then place the blame on the assumptions of perfect rationality and selfish 
preferences, while arguing game theory’s concepts are still necessarily true? The 
difficulty with this approach is that it doesn’t help us decide how to apply game 
theory to human behaviour. We seem to be saying that the concepts (coupled with the 
standard auxiliary assumptions) are very useful descriptively and normatively, except 
when they are not, in which cases we need different auxiliary assumptions. But when 
a theory is demonstrated not to predict in a context-independent way, its usefulness 
diminishes, a fate already befallen Expected-Utility Theory. 
 
A better response is to acknowledge that complete context-independence is 
unrealistic, but try to extend the domain of game theory (GT) by incorporating into it 
a small number of critical extra factors suggested by the data. Suppose that in some 
contexts we suspect that our predictions are failing because players care about the 
intentions they ascribe to the other players. Psychological Game Theory (PGT) was 
developed (see Geanakoplos et al 1989) for such a case as it allows utilities to depend 
not just on money but also on a player’s beliefs regarding the intentions of other 
players. In equilibrium, these beliefs are correct, and a Psychological Nash 
Equilibrium (PNE) will exist. Camerer discusses PGT in Chapter 2. 
 
A development such as PGT both acknowledges that behaviour is not invariant across 
contexts where beliefs about intentions do and don’t matter, but also builds upon the 
framework of game theory by adding the tools to predict or explain outcomes in those 
contexts where intentions matter. Game theory’s predictions then become consistent 
with known empirical regularities (summarised in Chapter 2) and its new concepts, 
such as PNE, can be a source of insight and understanding regarding human strategic 
behaviour and its outcomes. Influential papers that have built upon this framework   5 
include Rabin (1993) and more recently, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004); 
Camerer discusses these at length in pp.105-110.  
 
An implication of this type of extension to GT is that two games with identical 
payoffs from the standard perspective may lead to different behaviour if one and only 
one game leads players to care about intentions. For example one-shot ultimatum 
games and prisoner’s dilemma games may cause players to transform utilities as in 
PGT when the other party is believed to be another person. But if told in advance that 
the other party is a computer making pre-programmed choices we may now disregard 
the intentions of that player and behave much as standard GT would predict. This is 
consistent with experimental findings, including a few experiments which use fMRI 
scans of player’s brains as they make their choices under these different conditions, 
which find significant differences in the activity levels of brain regions concerned 
with social interactions (e.g., McCabe et al 2001; Rilling et al 2002).  
 
An advantage of allowing data from experiments to drive theoretical advances in 
game theory is that it makes game theory much more empirical than has previously 
been the case, at least in economics. Such a change of direction has been advocated by 
other researchers as the only real way forward if game theory is to provide new 
understanding about our social world (e.g., Sugden 2001). Camerer is clearly also in 
this camp. 
 
A second area of controversy concerns the role of natural selection in generating the 
behavioural deviations from GT. Camerer excludes experimental games reported in 
the Biology journals (such as Evolution and Human Behavior) from his book, and has 
some moderately hostile things to say about the usefulness of looking to evolution for 
explanations of data or new hypotheses regarding human strategic interactions (see 
p.116). I find his claims too sweeping; indeed, one could say the idea players may 
exhibit concerns for reciprocity and fairness in certain games rather than selfishness is 
itself a prediction from evolutionary rather than economic theory. One interesting 
study from the biology literature that draws on kin-selection (Segal and Hershberger 
1999) predicted that rates of cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma games played between 
non-identical twins would be lower than that for identical twins. The study found   6 
strong support for this hypothesis, suggesting evolutionary explanations do have a 
role to play here.  
 
Part of the difficulty of using evolutionary logic is that economists differ in what they 
think evolutionary arguments do and do not predict. Camerer notes (p.68) that in 
dictator and ultimatum games young children exhibit self-interested behaviour, 
becoming fair-minded only as they grow older. He argues this finding is crucial for 
implying fairness norms are not innate. But it is not clear that this shows any such 
thing: it is well known from the evolution of life histories that particular genes switch 
on and/or switch off at different phases of human development. For example language 
(Pinker 1994), puberty, etc. Indeed the entire developmental process is itself under 
genetic control. More generally, a key adaptive feature of humans is their behavioural 
flexibility in the face of a rapidly changing social and natural environment. When 
behaviour varies across cultures the variation often itself has an adaptive function; 
numerous examples are given in Barrett, Dunbar and Lycett (2002). 
 
Before we leave this controversial topic, recent research (Brosnan & De Waal 2003) 
found that females of another cooperative primate, the brown capuchin monkey, 
exhibit social emotions similar to human responders in an ultimatum game in 
analogous circumstances. Their work suggests a sense of fairness might be selected 
for among intelligent social species rather than being a unique product of human 
culture. Culture may shape the raw material we are already endowed with, but it is not 
by itself the source of our sense of fairness. 
 
A third issue is the growing use in this literature of Quantal Response Equilibrium, or 
QRE. While Nash Equilibrium assumes a player selects the best response from among 
his options with certainty, QRE allows a degree of noise into the process. If, given 
their beliefs over other player’s strategies, options with greater expected values are 
selected with a larger probability we have a statistical equivalent of Nash equilibrium 
called QRE. A parameter λ in a logit response function captures a player’s sensitivity 
to differences in the expected values of her alternatives. If λ=0, she cares nothing for 
differences in the expected values of her options and chooses randomly, and if λ is 
large, her behaviour converges back on the Nash equilibrium.  
   7 
Camerer introduces QRE in a brief but useful Appendix to chapter 1 on the rudiments 
of game theory, and makes reference to it in subsequent chapters. Given that it is now 
well known from tests of expected utility theory that human players make errors in 
choices, QRE is obviously an important development for experimental game theory. 
But is it fair to conclude (as on p.239) that error rather than other causes such as 
cooperativeness can ‘mop up’ behavioural deviations from GT, allowing the estimated 
λ to vary dramatically in magnitude so as to achieve the best fit with the data (in 
chapter 3 alone, estimates of λ vary from 0.248 to 3.24)?  
 
Referring back to the experiments where subjects played prisoner’s dilemma games 
against both humans and computers, is it reasonable to say our error rate rises when 
we know we’re playing people, or is it not really error but social utility at work? 
Kiyonari et al (2000) in their study of one-shot dilemma games varied both the 
financial incentives of subject’s decisions and the degree to which a social exchange 
heuristic would be triggered. They found that rates of cooperation rise as the 
incentives are increased, and fall as the social context (and incentives) is reduced. 
They suggest that choice patterns such as these indicate the ‘error’ of cooperation is 
the result of an adaptive heuristic. If such non-Nash behaviour in one-shot games is 
simply error (see for example Goeree and Holt, 2001), that error behaves most 
counter-intuitively: increasing when the degree of realism and the magnitude of the 
consequences rise.  
 
Perhaps an error term can be combined with some social preferences theory to jointly 
explain the data? More fundamentally, is the concept of error used in QRE correct? 
Continuing the parallel to the experimental literature on expected utility theory, the λ 
in QRE is akin to the Hey & Orme (1994), or Fechner concept of error, which is not 
the only possibility. Other approaches based on random and/or hazy preferences are 
also possible (e.g., Loomes and Sugden 1995) but have not been incorporated into 
behavioural game theory so far.  
 
Chapter Highlights 
Camerer opens chapter 1 by listing more than a dozen seemingly distinct real-world 
problems united by the power of game theory to explain and predict their outcomes. 
He points out that in this task game theory is often right but also often wrong. It goes   8 
wrong because too much theorising has been based on introspection and assumption 
rather than observation, an “imbalance of theory and facts” he hopes to help redress. 
One of his examples is of ultimatum bargaining, which we saw earlier. He claims 
negative reciprocity lies behind a responder’s rejection of unfair offers even at 
substantial cost to themselves, drawing an intriguing analogy to jilted boyfriends 
harassing former girlfriends. 
 
On the question of whether this behaviour results from cultural standards or from 
evolution, not surprisingly he prefers the cultural standards story. However evidence 
from psychobiology (e.g., Panksepp 1998) shows that the ‘rage’ system in the 
mammalian brain is closely linked to centres in the cortex that anticipate rewards. If 
an anticipated reward is not forthcoming, anger or aggression follows swiftly. Given 
these primitive connections perhaps even reciprocity seems too cognitively advanced 
a cause for responder actions. 
 
After a helpful Appendix to Chapter 1 on the rudiments of game theory, a second 
Appendix discusses experimental methodology. This is a more controversial subject 
as nearly everyone has their own ideas on good and bad practice, however Camerer’s 
views here are probably as close to the mainstream as any. One amusing example of 
poor reasoning is given in the section on incentives in this Appendix.  He relates 
(p.40) an anecdote from the reality TV finale of a series of Survivor. One defeated 
contestant had to decide which of the two finalists he should vote for, and asked them 
both to choose an integer from 1-9, his vote going to the player choosing closest to his 
own (secret) number. The first player guessed 7, to which the second player 
responded with a guess of 3, an option clearly dominated by 6. As the prize at stake 
was $1 million, in expected value terms this was an extraordinarily costly mistake, 
suggesting powerful incentives don’t necessarily improve decision quality. 
 
Chapter 2 focuses on the huge literature on dictator, ultimatum and trust games, about 
which I have already commented. Camerer also discusses some theories of social 
preference that try to account for this data, such as Rabin (1993) on p.106. It is 
interesting to note that the transformations of payoffs involved in Rabin’s model do 
not conform to those apparently reported by subjects in the Kiyonari et al (2000) 
study. Whether this is due to flaws in their methodology or weaknesses in Rabin’s   9 
conception of fairness is a question worthy of investigation. A couple of errors also 
creep into Chapter 2, the most prominent on p.45 is his formalisation of the structure 
of public goods games. His equations in the main text are inconsistent with those in 
the footnote on the same page; worse, they are both wrong.  
 
Chapter 3 looks at the evidence on the often counter-intuitive predictions of mixed 
strategy equilibria, which turns out to be surprisingly supportive. Several experiments 
looked at versions of Hotelling’s location game, with 2, 3 and 4 firms selecting a point 
along a line [0, 100] at which they should locate. Support was found for the well-
known 2 player equilibrium of side-by-side at 50, but more interestingly, also for the 
less well known 3 player equilibrium of randomisation over the interval [25, 75], with 
no choices below 25 or above 75. Although the data didn’t match the prediction 
perfectly (p.144), it is surprisingly close (Collins and Sherstyuk, 2000). The 4 player 
equilibrium predicts two clusters of firms, one at 25 and the other at 75. Hück, Müller 
and Vriend (2002) found reasonable support for this prediction, although a 
disequilibrium cluster at 50 was also found.  
 
Applications of mixed strategy equilibrium to sports such as tennis and soccer are also 
discussed towards the end of Chapter 3, this time using field experiments. The Walker 
& Wooders (2001) paper on top tennis players found good support for most 
predictions of the theory across a number of high level matches, although there was 
some evidence of over-alternation in the direction of serves. As an American, 
Camerer is to be congratulated for at least trying to explain penalty kicks in soccer (p. 
146), even though on this occasion his attempt was quite inaccurate. Despite this, the 
research on soccer found decent support for the predictions of mixed strategy 
equilibrium (Palacios-Heurta 2001), confirming the related evidence from tennis 
matches. 
 
In Chapter 4 experiments on structured and unstructured bargaining are discussed, 
with generally more mixed results than in the previous chapter. In unstructured 
bargaining one problem subjects have when trying to strike a deal is that they often 
believe solutions that favour themselves are ‘fair’, making agreement with each other 
harder. For instance in bargaining over lottery tickets, Roth and Malouf (1979) found 
that when two players have unequal prizes, arguments for a 50:50 division of the   10 
tickets nearly always come from the high prize player. More generally if multiple 
focal points exist, players tend to push for the one under which they personally would 
do better. 
 
For structured bargaining one interesting study by Johnson et al (2002) used software 
called mouselab to record the information subjects seek when bargaining in 
alternating-offer experiments, and how long they spend at each stage of the process, to 
infer what approach the subject is using. By requiring subjects to click on boxes to 
reveal the current and future pie sizes the authors could see whether subjects engaged 
in backward induction to locate the sub-game perfect equilibrium. A significant 
minority didn’t even open the second- and third-round boxes, making backward 
induction impossible to implement. However after receiving training on backward 
induction, outcomes improved significantly. This suggests that it is the unfamiliarity 
of subjects with the necessary concepts that explains the divergence between 
prediction and reality. But given that few people in reality have the necessary 
conceptual tools required, perhaps we need two separate sets of models and 
predictions: one for the small minority of trained subjects and another for everybody 
else? Alternatively, maybe there is a much larger niche for economists in training 
people how to think strategically than we assume. 
 
Chapter 5 presents a number of interesting findings on dominance solvable games. 
These games require subjects to iteratively eliminate any (strongly or weakly) 
dominated strategies, and assume other players will do likewise, until a unique sub-
game perfect equilibrium is achieved. We referred earlier to Beauty Contest games 
which are a very useful tool for investigating how deeply subjects actually reason. 
Briefly, each of N players must simultaneously choose a number in [0,100]. There is a 
fraction p of the average number chosen which defines the target for each person to 
aim for to win the prize. If p = ⅔, and the average number chosen in some experiment 
is 60, then the winner is the player closest to 40.  
 
It should be apparent (although it isn’t always) that any number in [67,100] is a 
dominated option, chosen only by ‘zero-step’ players; if we believe that others realise 
this also (one-step players), the highest possible average is 66, giving a target of 44. If 
everyone thinks everyone realises this (two-step), then the target is really ⅔ x 44, or   11 
about 29. If every player can follow this logic to its conclusion, and believes everyone 
else can too, the unique solution is to select 0. In reality most players are one or two 
step players. A few subjects do in fact select 0, but they never win the prize, being 
literally too smart for their own good! To win, a subject needs to use only one more 
level of reasoning than everyone else. Camerer appears somewhat inconsistent with 
his definitions here: on p.210 he defines a two-step player as choosing in [29, 44] but 
by p.217 he switches definitions (now starting from the mid-point of 50) so that a 
choice of 22 suggests a two-step player. Nonetheless the results he presents in this 
section are powerful and sobering, suggesting that even for very intelligent subject 
pools we are heavily cognitively constrained, or at the least, believe our fellows are. 
 
The centipede game is also popular with experimentalists. A simple version has two 
players moving sequentially, each of whom must decide to “take” T or “pass” P. The 
size of the pie doubles each time a player chooses P, but ends when a player chooses 
T. The twist is that the share of the total pie each player would get alternates between 
20% and 80% with each move. Backward induction shows equilibrium play is to 
“take” at the first opportunity, but frequently some degree of tacit cooperation is 
achieved. A four-move version (McKelvey and Palfrey 1992) finds players rarely 
“take” in the early stages, but the cooperation unravels towards the end of the game, 
once again suggesting many people use a couple of steps of iterated dominance only. 
 
Other versions have used more players, more steps, and higher incentives. Rapoport et 
al (2003) used very high stakes (potentially thousands of dollars) in a 3-player 
centipede game and found more support for Nash behaviour. But a key difference in 
their design is that the terminal node gave all three players zero, which would work 
against subjects adopting a ‘best for all if we pass” philosophy as no player now 
wishes to pass until the end. Camerer’s discussion of this study (p.221) is therefore 
incorrect to state that ‘subjects could have made thousands of dollars if they passed to 
the end...’ and his conclusion that ‘a sufficient condition for Nash behaviour seems to 
be three players and high stakes’ is also called into question. It would be interesting, 
and potentially very expensive, to redo this experiment with the standard progression 
of payoffs rather than a terminal node of zeroes! 
   12 
Chapter 6 investigates theories of how players learn in games, looking at evolutionary 
dynamics, reinforcement learning and belief learning among others. Camerer and Ho 
(1999) offer Experience-Weighted-Attraction (EWA) as a more general theory 
incorporating reinforcement and belief learning as special cases. One problem I have 
with the models tested in this chapter is that they appear to me to start from rather 
implausible premises. For example reinforcement learning is grounded in the long-
discredited behaviourist psychology of people like B.F. Skinner. Additionally the 
evolutionary approach described here assumes players are born with an unchanging 
strategy, the more successful ones increasing in relative frequency over time. This has 
little to do with how an evolutionary psychologist for example, would view human 
learning. Overall the evidence reported in this chapter strikes me as inconclusive, 
although EWA performs better across a wider range of games than the simpler 
theories. I hope future learning models will draw upon some more cogent and up-to-
date psychology than the ‘blank-slate’ theories discussed here. 
 
Chapter 7 looks at coordination games as a solution to the problem of multiple 
equilibria. This is one of the most engaging chapters in this book because a country’s 
history is often involved in the selection of one equilibrium over another. It also 
highlights the importance of experimental methods in game theory research as 
mathematics alone often can’t tell us which outcome should or will occur. Memorable 
anecdotes on the origins of conventions (pp.338-340) include the standard width of 
railway tracks, the geographical concentration of certain industries in specific 
locations, and why some countries drive on the left while others drive on the right.  
 
One story I like is the story of driving in Bolivia. Although Bolivians normally drive 
on the right and so have steering wheels in the left of the vehicle, they switch sides on 
mountain roads. This is because those roads are narrow and dangerous with no easy 
view of the cliff edge from the driver’s seat. By switching sides both sets of drivers 
gain a clearer view of the most dangerous sections. Fortunately there are road signs 
that warn drivers the convention is about to be reversed, however it does seem that 
Bolivia settled on the wrong choice of equilibrium back in the mists of time.  
A general finding from this literature is that for many non-rational reasons players 
often succeed in coordinating their actions, if they have a common conception of a 
more prominent or focal choice. Where there are clashing focal points coordination   13 
failure is more common. Allowing communication between players can be some help 
both when it allows them to focus on just one equilibrium and when it provides 
assurance they’ll behave as they say. Interestingly this means that in some games one-
way communication works better than two-way, while in others the reverse is true. 
 
Chapter 8 looks at signalling, screening and reputation games. In a signalling game 
one player takes some action to signal his ‘type’ or future intentions to uninformed 
players if the costs of the signal are outweighed by the benefits he accrues from the 
receivers of the signal believing the message. A credible signal is affordable only by 
the type that sends it, leading to separating equilibrium. Pooling equilibrium often 
results if both types can afford the signal. This phenomenon occurs in the business 
world when a firm offers a very generous warranty or guarantee on its product, to 
overcome unjustified suspicion regarding its quality.  
 
Experimentally however many players fail both to draw the full logical inferences of 
how their actions reveal their private information to others, and to rapidly infer the 
types of other players from their actions. Given that real players are then boundedly 
rational, Camerer refers to a study by Cooper, Garvin and Kagel (1997) who note that 
this fact provides a role for the use of redundant signals in these games, to clarify and 
reinforce messages. 
 
The book closes with a useful summary of the main findings of the earlier chapters 
and an Appendix describing the design details of 90 of the experimental studies 
discussed previously. Also in Chapter 9 he offers a wide-ranging list of his top ten 
open research questions in behavioural game theory, divided into five where the 
answers are becoming clearer such as how we value the payoffs of others, and five 
where much is still to be done, such as what games subjects think they’re playing. He 
ends with the reasonable and I think realistic hope that eventually the ‘behavioural’ 
label can be dispensed with as mainstream game theory inexorably absorbs the many 
lessons from this reality check and fulfils at last its initial promise. Judging from the 
research documented in this excellent book, we may not have long to wait.   14 
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